INTRODUCTION
The Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), an aircraft collision avoidance system designed to prevent mid-air collisions, provides guidance in response to dangerous situations by monitoring the nearby airspace for other aircraft equipped with transponders and displays them on a horizontal, plan-view traffic situation display (TSD). As an additional precaution, TCAS issues advisories that act as a last-resort safety net. Should a conflict arise between two aircraft a "traffic advisory" (TA) is issued in the form of an aural "Traffic Traffic" and is shown on the TSD. If warranted, a more time-critical "resolution advisory" (RA) is then generated, portraying a vertical collision avoidance maneuver for the pilot to execute. Complying with an RA is generally considered the safest course of action and takes priority over air traffic instructions. However, pilot compliance with TCAS RAs is lower was assumed in the initial safety analyses.
One proposed solution to low compliance is an 'Auto-RA' function which couples the autoflight system to TCAS such that, when the autopilot is engaged, it automatically executes any corrective RAs. Such Auto-RA functions are being installed on foreign aircraft and are proposed for further installation on new aircraft and for software retrofit to a large fleet of established aircraft. As such, its implementation may become widespread in domestic air transport operations in the foreseeable future.
This study examines how pilots interact with TCAS with and without an 'Auto-RA' function. This study focuses specifically on two types of traffic events, all created within a realistic traffic environment: first, disruptive scenarios in which the RA disrupts the aircraft from its assigned flight path (requiring the pilot to remember and re-establish the correct flight path after the RA); and, second, RAs that modify the commanded vertical maneuver in response to unexpected maneuvering by the other aircraft such that the vertical speed commanded by the RA "strengthens" or even "reverses" (i.e., switches from descent to climb, or from climb to descent).
This study builds on a previous flight simulator study which examined how pilots interact with TCAS with and without an 'Auto-RA' function in place. This study found that pilots allowed the autoflight system to fly the RA maneuver in 83% of the runs. The majority of the remaining situations where the pilots disconnected the Auto-RA function generally involved a particular scenario which involved counterintuitive guidance (i.e. a Crossing Climb RA). Additionally, while 10 of 12 pilots explicitly expressed a positive opinion of the Auto-RA function, eight indicated that there might be intricate and perplexing situations (e.g. 'Dual RAs', crossing RAs, automation malfunctions, etc.) where they would not trust it. Additionally, after Clear of Conflict (CoC), the Auto-RA function changed how the pilots re-engaged the autopilot to resume the required flight path. With the Auto-RA function, pilots were less likely to resume their previous lateral autopilot mode. While no significant difference was found in reestablishing the correct vertical modes, pilot comments suggested they had trouble remembering whether any speed or altitude targets had been issued to them by ATC beyond those that remained in their mode control panel.
Thus, this study focused on particularly problematic traffic encounters (including those in which the RA modified by changing strength or reversing during the maneuver), and on situations where the Auto-RA might disrupt pilots from meeting a specified air traffic restriction. Sixteen air transport pilots participated in the study. Pilots acted as captain in flights conducted in an integrated flight deck / air traffic simulator, aided by a first officer familiar with the simulator and interacting realistically with an air traffic controller through arrivals into the Dallas-Fort Worth airport (DFW) with high traffic density. Throughout, the pilots were asked to act as they would in real operations.
METHOD Experiment Procedure
The entire procedure was created to fit within a four hour time window, similar to that used in flight simulator training. After informed consent and a briefing on the simulator and the Auto-RA function, the pilot transitioned into the simulator for (nominally) two training flights and eight experiment flights; the pilots were given the option to repeat any aspect of the training flights. After every flight the pilot completed the post-run questionnaire and was offered a break. At the end of all the experiment flights, the pilot transitioned back to the briefing area for a de-briefing, for a post-experiment questionnaire.
Experiment Tasks
The participant sat in the left (Captain's) seat, assuming the duties of 'Pilot Flying,' and thus was responsible for controlling the aircraft and the ultimate safety of the flight. A researcher who was familiar with the simulator sat on the right seat posing as the First Officer (FO) and assumed the duties of the 'Pilot Not Flying', i.e., managing the aircraft systems and interacting with ATC. The participant was asked to contribute to all required checklists, beginning with the approach briefing and checklist at the start of the flight.
The pilot was placed in a 'real' air traffic environment from the start to emphasize that his behavior should exemplify what he would do in real operations, including his interactions with the air traffic controller. Another two researchers at an air traffic simulator posed as the air traffic controller (ATC) and pilots of surrounding aircraft. Before the TCAS TA or RA events the air traffic controller sometimes called out the traffic to the pilot and FO, and sometimes communicated with the aircraft causing the traffic event (providing 'party-line information' which could be useful in predicting the development of the traffic event, but which may not be apparent to the participant without careful monitoring of the voice communications). While the FO was responsible for handling air traffic communications, they could also be overheard by the captain and the captain could call for, or make himself, any call to air traffic control as desired. The FO was responsible for ensuring the captain understood air traffic instructions directed to their aircraft, but otherwise did not coach the pilot.
Typically, the flights began around an altitude of 10,000 to 20,000 feet and lasted 15 minutes. The flights ended during the approach intercept. In each flight, pilots encountered two traffic events. Some of events resulted only in TCAS TAs and required no maneuvering. The more severe events resulted in TCAS RAs which displayed a vertical maneuver to the pilot.
Apparatus
The 'Reconfigurable Flight Simulator' emulated a twocrew flight deck with the flight displays and underlying models of the aircraft dynamics and aircraft systems based on a B747-400. A basic physical mockup mounted computer monitors in approximately the correct location for each flightdeck display, and provided the captain with a yoke and mockup of a throttle quadrant's structure. The monitor in front of the pilot provided the B747-400 Primary Flight Display (PFD) and Navigation Display (ND); this was mirrored on the first officer's side. A large touch screen in front of the throttle quadrant provided the Control Display Unit (CDU), Mode Control Panel (MCP), control's for the captain's ND, Engine Indication and Crew Alerting Display (EICAS), and levers for flaps, gear and speed brakes; the pilot could also interact with these systems with a computer mouse.
Additionally, an air traffic control station used the traffic display and traffic emulation provided by the FAA's Traffic Generation Facility (TGF), populated with traffic flows recorded from real operations. Dynamic models steered intruder aircraft relative to the participant's aircraft. Through a priori analysis, their relative trajectories were predetermined such that, barring significant deviations from the expected flight profile, traffic events would create specific TCAS advisories of interest: only the pre-cautionary TA, or both a TA and an RA of a pre-determined type.
An experimenter acting as air traffic controller interacted with the pilot according to proper air traffic procedures via a voice channel established using an aviation intercom. Another experimenter acted as 'party-line,' i.e. providing the voice communications of all other aircraft, aided by pre-established transcripts. Both the captain (participant) and first officer (experimenter) wore aviation headsets with a hot intercom within the flightdeck and push-to-talk button to broadcast on the air traffic frequency. Thus, the apparatus afforded realistic air traffic communications, which were all recorded.
TCAS was emulated according to the standards required of the Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for TCAS. The full alerting and advisory-generation logic for TCAS Version 7.1 was implemented for two-aircraft conflicts. The resulting advisories were portrayed to the pilot via the required aural call outs, and all visual presentations were provided to the pilot including portrayal of the commanded maneuver on the PFD (both as a commanded vertical speed and as a commanded pitch). The TCAS TSD was mounted above the ND, with its range slaved to the ND range selected by the pilot. It was driven by the air traffic simulator; thus, it portrayed all traffic in the vicinity of the ownship during arrival and approach into DFW at times of high traffic density.
Experiment Design
Each scenario was a unique combination of five independent variables: the TCAS mode (with or without auto-RA), whether the RA was modified (strengthened, reversed, or commanded a consistent vertical maneuver), whether the auto-RA maneuver was disruptive (i.e., whether it would likely disrupt the pilot from reconfiguring the autoflight system appropriately for air traffic instructions once clear of conflict), the type of RA generated, and by ATC Communications (i.e., whether the controller provided a traffic callout to the pilot or the pilot instead had to listen to the party-line. Each pilot flew each scenario, with the run order assignment balanced through a Latin Square design.
RESULTS
The first metric examined pilot acceptance of the Auto-RA function, assessed by measuring whether the pilots disabled the function by disengaging the autopilot. Pilots left the autopilot engaged in 120 of the 157 RAs (76%) experienced with the Auto-RA function. Table 1 summarizes the breakdown of this rate between several independent variables. The significant source of variance in the choice to disable the Auto-A came from the pilots -four (the 'lowest users' quartile in Table 1 ) disabled the Auto-RA function more than half the time, which was significantly more than for all the other pilots (p<0.05). At the other extreme, four pilots (the 'highest users' quartile) never disconnected the autopilot during an Auto-RA. No demographic trend could be found (e.g., flight experience) to explain which pilots belonged to which quartile. 
100%
In the 120 runs in which the Auto-RA function was left engaged, compliance to the RA was assumed to be 100%; in the 37 runs when it was disengaged, pilots complied to the RA 3 times. Thus, with the Auto-RA function available, the RA was complied with in (120+3)/157 cases, or 78% of the time. For comparison, pilots complied in 39 of the 74 runs without the Auto-RA function, which is 53% of the time.
Pilot acceptance of the Auto RA function was also examined in a post-experiment questionnaire. Twelve of the sixteen participants explicitly expressed a positive opinion, stating they found the Auto-RA function to be a "good idea" or a "useful tool." They thought it "was nice to have the autopilot perform the task so that [they] could more effectively monitor and maintain situational awareness." Four participants indicated they thought the Auto-RA function should have maneuvered more aggressively. "I choose to let [the Auto-RA function] fly [the RA]. Had I been manually flying the RA, I know I would have utilized a more aggressive profile." Two participants expressed concern about following the Auto-RA when it "behaved unexpectedly," which may include RAs that cross the altitude of the intruder aircraft or that reverse direction.
Four participants gave examples of situations or scenarios where they would not have good situation awareness of the traffic situation before the auto-RA. These scenarios include high traffic intensity ("the TCAS display was too cluttered to discern which target was the biggest threat"), during high workload or multitasking ("[if the] intruder comes up while my attention is elsewhere"), display issues ("If traffic were coming from behind and was not displayed on my MFD") and emergency situations or in poor weather.
Eight participants gave examples of traffic situations where they would not trust the Auto-RA feature. This includes crossing RAs ("Climbing RA into descending traffic", "When I can see the aircraft is below us and I'm given a decent RA"), progressive RAs ("increase climb/descent situations"), reversals ("Numerous auto-RAs were initially given as one, only to require the complete opposite soon afterwards. This is a major issue"), dual RAs, ("Multiple targets") and highly congested airspace. In addition, the participants also noted situations or conditions where the TCAS advisory may not be appropriate to follow, including aircraft with performance restrictions, "emergency situations," flight without the autothrottle, and descending when already near the ground. Thus, thirteen participants explicitly mentioned that pilots should monitor the Auto-RA function when it is executed. Four explicitly stated that pilots should be required to callout out the RA to the ATC and three mentioned being ready to take over and hand fly if necessary.
Examining the more detailed results shown in Table 2 , 43 measures were analyzed using R, version 2.15.2 for Windows. In general, binary or categorical data were analyzed to see whether its frequency varied between different levels of each of the independent variables, between pilots, due to run order, and a post-hoc comparison between conditions where the pilot did/did not comply to the RA. When the data were distributed sufficiently between conditions, a Pearson's chi-squared test was used to identify differences in frequency; in other cases, a Fisher exact test was applied. For continuously-varying interval data, random effects due to pilot and due to run order were first tested by comparing a Generalized Least Square Model (of the independent variables alone) and a Linear Mixed Effects Model (of the independent variables with pilot or run order included as a random effect), using a loglikelihood test and a restricted log likelihood test based on simulated p-values (when this one was possible to run). A pvalue smaller than 0.05 indicated that including the random effect significantly improved the model fit. The subsequent analysis of the independent variables then applied the bestfitting model in an ANOVA examining for effects due to the independent variables. Post-hoc analyses within independent variables found to be significant first applied Levene's test to examine for heterogeneity in variance, and then the most appropriate method for pairwise comparison was selected based on the statistical properties of the measure.
The first set of measures examines pilot responses to RAs in those conditions where the pilot flew them directly: i.e., conditions in which either the Auto-RA function was not available, or where the pilot chose to dis-engage it and fly the RA directly. Some pilot effects were found in how fast they disengaged the autopilot, and the vertical speed they flew, but Instead of consistently finding significant differences between pilots, attributes of the scenario (as defined by the independent variables) were found to cause the most significant effects on all measure of pilot response to the RA. Some aspects of the scenario were obvious to the pilot in the time frame leading up to, and including, the start of the RA: the availability of the Auto-RA function, whether it was disruptive and whether they had received a call-out from ATC all impacted whether the pilots disconnected the autopilot to fly the RA and when. Other independent variables impact compliance, again including the availability of the Auto-RA and then attributes of the RA -the type of RA planned to first appear, and then whether it modifies (i.e., reverses or strengthens). All of the measures correlate with whether the pilot fully complied with the RA, except for those reflecting very unusual maneuverings (aggressive vertical maneuvers, horizontal maneuvers). A notable impact of the Auto-RA function was its impact on the time to achieve the vertical rate: the time to achieve the RA vertical rate is significantly slower in Auto-RA over-rides than cases with no Auto-RA function, an effect that correlated with whether the pilot's maneuver complied with the RA.
Pilot behaviors after clear of conflict vary significantly between pilots. How long it took to re-engage the autopilot significantly decreased in the scenarios where the pilot received a call out from ATC. Likewise, pilots took significantly longer to contact ATC after RAs that strengthened or reversed.
Examining the third set of measures, several significant differences exist between pilots in whether, and when, they chose to contact ATC through the different epochs. The type of RA (initial planned and whether it modified) also impacted when the pilots contacted ATC just before and during an RA. Of interest, pilots' behavior in terms of when they contacted ATC was found to correlate with whether they complied with the RA, and varied with the type of RA that was created by the traffic event.
An eye-tracker mounted in the simulator monitored when the pilots viewed the navigation display (ND), traffic situation display (TSD), primary flight display (PFD), control display unit (CDU), and mode control panel (MCP). Significant differences were found between pilots, suggesting that pilots may not be trained to consistent strategies for monitoring flightdeck displays during traffic events. The pilots also appeared to have different monitoring strategies with different types of traffic events. For example, many pilots viewed the TSD differently during the TA depending on attributes of the traffic event as described by the subsequent RA that they would receive.
The Auto-RA also significantly increased pilot viewing during the RA of the ND, TSD, PFD and CDU. An effect of similar magnitude was also found in that call outs from ATC also increased pilot viewing during the RA of the ND, TSD and CDU. Pilot viewing of the PFD during the RA was positively correlated with pilot compliance to the RA; note, the RA's avoidance maneuver is portrayed on the PFD and so, when the pilot is executing the RA, it must be monitored.
CONCLUSIONS
So, can we automate compliance to TCAS RAs by having the autoflight system perform them automatically? These results suggest that automation can help, but not guarantee full compliance: the Auto-RA function only shifted the compliance rate from 53% to 76%. In other studies in which pilots execute the RA's themselves, compliance varied significantly with the independent variables tested here: the type of TCAS RA generated initially and whether it then modified, and the ATC communications available to the pilot as the traffic event evolved. It remains possible that these factors may also drive when the pilots would accept an Auto-RA. If so, the Auto-RA function may be characterized as improving compliance to the sorts of events for which pilots already generally comply, but not improving compliance to the sorts of events that pilots do not comply with.
Of note, the most significant factor impacting acceptance of the Auto-RA function and its impact on compliance were the pilots themselves. Grouping the pilots into quartiles by the rate at which they accepted the Auto-RA function, the quartile with the lowest acceptance of the Auto-RA function only left the autopilot engaged in 38% of the RAs; in contrast, the highest quartile accepted it 100% of the time. Thus, pilot training may be critically important.
In a broader sense, the availability of the Auto-RA function also significantly impacted several aspects of pilot behavior. Some of these behaviors manifested during the RAs, where pilots who chose to dis-engage the Auto-RA function then executed their avoidance maneuver differently than when the Auto-RA function was not available at all: they dis-engaged the autopilot at different times, and flew different vertical speeds. The Auto-RA function also impacted the pilots' viewing of key flightdeck instruments during the RAs. Further, when pilots chose to dis-engage the Auto-RA function during RA, they also took longer to re-engage the autopilot after the RA.
Some benefits of the Auto-RA function hypothesized in the industry, beyond generating perfect compliance to TCAS RAs, include that the Auto-RA function may allow the pilot to better monitor the traffic situation and communicate with the air traffic controller. However, the availability of the Auto-RA function had no significant impact on when, or if, the pilots contacted ATC during traffic events. Further, pilot scanning of the TSD was driven during the preliminary TA by the traffic event itself, and during the RA also by the air traffic communications in the minutes leading up to the event. Thus, the pilots' scanning and communication activities appear to be more complex than simple reliance on the Auto-RA.
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